31 posts tagged “history”
Bit of a history lesson here. On March 18, 2003, 12.35 p.m., from Hansard.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Tony Blair): I beg to move,
- That this House notes its decisions of 25th November 2002 and 26th February 2003 to endorse UN Security Council Resolution 1441; recognises that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles, and its continuing non-compliance with Security Council Resolutions, pose a threat to international peace and security; notes that in the 130 days since Resolution 1441 was adopted Iraq has not co-operated actively, unconditionally and immediately with the weapons inspectors, and has rejected the final opportunity to comply and is in further material breach of its obligations under successive mandatory UN Security Council Resolutions; regrets that despite sustained diplomatic effort by Her Majesty's Government it has not proved possible to secure a second Resolution in the UN because one Permanent Member of the Security Council made plain in public its intention to use its veto whatever the circumstances; notes the opinion of the Attorney General that, Iraq having failed to comply and Iraq being at the time of Resolution 1441 and continuing to be in material breach, the authority to use force under Resolution 678 has revived and so continues today; believes that the United Kingdom must uphold the authority of the United Nations as set out in Resolution 1441 and many Resolutions preceding it, and therefore supports the decision of Her Majesty's Government that the United Kingdom should use all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; offers wholehearted support to the men and women of Her Majesty's Armed Forces now on duty in the Middle East; in the event of military operations requires that, on an urgent basis, the United Kingdom should seek a new Security Council Resolution that would affirm Iraq's territorial integrity, ensure rapid delivery of humanitarian relief, allow for the earliest possible lifting of UN sanctions, an international reconstruction programme, and the use of all oil revenues for the benefit of the Iraqi people and endorse an appropriate post-conflict administration for Iraq, leading to a representative government which upholds human rights and the rule of law for all Iraqis; and also welcomes the imminent publication of the Quartet's roadmap as a significant step to bringing a just and lasting peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians and for the wider Middle East region, and endorses the role of Her Majesty's Government in actively working for peace between Israel and Palestine.
At the outset, I say that it is right that the House debate this issue and pass judgment. That is the democracy that is our right, but that others struggle for in vain. Again, I say that I do not disrespect the views in opposition to mine. This is a tough choice indeed, but it is also a stark one: to stand British troops down now and turn back, or to hold firm to the course that we have set. I believe passionately that we must hold firm to that course. The question most often posed is not "Why does it matter?" but "Why does it matter so much?" Here we are, the Government, with their most serious test, their majority at risk, the first Cabinet resignation over an issue of policy, the main parties internally divided,
people who agree on everything else—[Hon. Members: "The main parties?"] Ah, yes, of course. The Liberal Democrats—unified, as ever, in opportunism and error. [Interruption.]
The country and the Parliament reflect each other. This is a debate that, as time has gone on, has become less bitter but no less grave. So why does it matter so much? Because the outcome of this issue will now determine more than the fate of the Iraqi regime and more than the future of the Iraqi people who have been brutalised by Saddam for so long, important though those issues are. It will determine the way in which Britain and the world confront the central security threat of the 21st century, the development of the United Nations, the relationship between Europe and the United States, the relations within the European Union and the way in which the United States engages with the rest of the world. So it could hardly be more important. It will determine the pattern of international politics for the next generation.
First, let us recap the history of Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. In April 1991, after the Gulf war, Iraq was given 15 days to provide a full and final declaration of all its weapons of mass destruction. Saddam had used the weapons against Iran and against his own people, causing thousands of deaths. He had had plans to use them against allied forces. It became clear, after the Gulf war, that Iraq's WMD ambitions were far more extensive than had hitherto been thought. So the issue was identified by the United Nations at that time as one for urgent remedy. UNSCOM, the weapons inspection team, was set up. It was expected to complete its task, following the declaration, at the end of April 1991. The declaration, when it came, was false: a blanket denial of the programme, other than in a very tentative form. And so the 12-year game began.
The inspectors probed. Finally, in March 1992, Iraq admitted that it had previously undeclared weapons of mass destruction, but it said that it had destroyed them. It gave another full and final declaration. Again the inspectors probed. In October 1994, Iraq stopped co-operating with the weapons inspectors altogether. Military action was threatened. Inspections resumed. In March 1996, in an effort to rid Iraq of the inspectors, a further full and final declaration of WMD was made. By July 1996, however, Iraq was forced to admit that declaration, too, was false.
In August, it provided yet another full and final declaration. Then, a week later, Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, defected to Jordan. He disclosed a far more extensive biological weapons programme and, for the first time, said that Iraq had weaponised the programme—something that Saddam had always strenuously denied. All this had been happening while the inspectors were in Iraq.
Kamal also revealed Iraq's crash programme to produce a nuclear weapon in the 1990s. Iraq was then forced to release documents that showed just how extensive those programmes were. In November 1996, Jordan intercepted prohibited components for missiles
that could be used for weapons of mass destruction. Then a further "full and final declaration" was made. That, too, turned out to be false.
In June 1997, inspectors were barred from specific sites. In September 1997, lo and behold, yet another "full and final declaration" was made—also false. Meanwhile, the inspectors discovered VX nerve agent production equipment, the existence of which had always been denied by the Iraqis.
In October 1997, the United States and the United Kingdom threatened military action if Iraq refused to comply with the inspectors. Finally, under threat of action in February 1998, Kofi Annan went to Baghdad and negotiated a memorandum with Saddam to allow inspections to continue. They did continue, for a few months. In August, co-operation was suspended.
In December, the inspectors left. Their final report is a withering indictment of Saddam's lies, deception and obstruction, with large quantities of weapons of mass destruction unaccounted for. Then, in December 1998, the US and the UK undertook Desert Fox, a targeted bombing campaign to degrade as much of the Iraqi WMD facility as we could.
In 1999, a new inspection team, UNMOVIC, was set up. Saddam refused to allow those inspectors even to enter Iraq. So there they stayed, in limbo, until, after resolution 1441 last November, they were allowed to return.
That is the history—and what is the claim of Saddam today? Why, exactly the same as before: that he has no weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, we are asked to believe that after seven years of obstruction and non-compliance, finally resulting in the inspectors' leaving in 1998—seven years in which he hid his programme and built it up, even when the inspectors were there in Iraq—when they had left, he voluntarily decided to do what he had consistently refused to do under coercion.
When the inspectors left in 1998, they left unaccounted for 10,000 litres of anthrax; a far-reaching VX nerve agent programme; up to 6,500 chemical munitions; at least 80 tonnes of mustard gas, and possibly more than 10 times that amount; unquantifiable amounts of sarin, botulinum toxin and a host of other biological poisons; and an entire Scud missile programme. We are asked now seriously to accept that in the last few years—contrary to all history, contrary to all intelligence—Saddam decided unilaterally to destroy those weapons. I say that such a claim is palpably absurd.
Resolution 1441 is very clear. It lays down a final opportunity for Saddam to disarm. It rehearses the fact that he has for years been in material breach of 17 UN resolutions. It says that this time compliance must be full, unconditional and immediate, the first step being a full and final declaration of all weapons of mass destruction to be given on 8 December last year.
I will not go through all the events since then, as the House is familiar with them, but this much is accepted by all members of the UN Security Council: the 8 December declaration is false. That in itself, incidentally, is a material breach. Iraq has taken some steps in co-operation, but no one disputes that it is not
fully co-operating. Iraq continues to deny that it has any weapons of mass destruction, although no serious intelligence service anywhere in the world believes it.
On 7 March, the inspectors published a remarkable document. It is 173 pages long, and details all the unanswered questions about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. It lists 29 different areas in which the inspectors have been unable to obtain information. On VX, for example, it says:
- "Documentation available to UNMOVIC suggests that Iraq at least had had far reaching plans to weaponise VX".
- "Mustard constituted an important part . . . of Iraq's CW arsenal . . . 550 mustard filled shells and up to 450 mustard filled aerial bombs unaccounted for . . . additional uncertainty"
with respect to over 6,500 aerial bombs,
- "corresponding to approximately 1,000 tonnes of agent, predominantly mustard."
On biological weapons, the inspectors' report states:
- "Based on unaccounted for growth media, Iraq's potential production of anthrax could have been in the range of about 15,000 to 25,000 litres . . . Based on all the available evidence, the strong presumption is that about 10,000 litres of anthrax was not destroyed and may still exist."
On that basis, I simply say to the House that, had we meant what we said in resolution 1441, the Security Council should have convened and condemned Iraq as in material breach. What is perfectly clear is that Saddam is playing the same old games in the same old way. Yes, there are minor concessions, but there has been no fundamental change of heart or mind.
However, after 7 March, the inspectors said that there was at least some co-operation, and the world rightly hesitated over war. Let me now describe to the House what then took place.
We therefore approached a second resolution in this way. As I said, we could have asked for the second resolution then and there, because it was justified. Instead, we laid down an ultimatum calling upon Saddam to come into line with resolution 1441, or be in material breach. That is not an unreasonable proposition, given the history, but still countries hesitated. They asked, "How do we judge what is full co-operation?"
So we then worked on a further compromise. We consulted the inspectors and drew up five tests, based on the document that they published on 7 March. Those tests included allowing interviews with 30 scientists to be held outside Iraq, and releasing details of the production of the anthrax, or at least of the documentation showing what had happened to it. The inspectors added another test: that Saddam should publicly call on Iraqis to co-operate with them.
So we constructed this framework: that Saddam should be given a specified time to fulfil all six tests to show full co-operation; and that, if he did so, the inspectors could then set out a forward work programme that would extend over a period of time to make sure that disarmament happened. However, if Saddam failed to meet those tests to judge compliance, action would follow.
So there were clear benchmarks, plus a clear ultimatum. Again, I defy anyone to describe that as an unreasonable proposition.
Last Monday, we were getting very close with it. We very nearly had the majority agreement. If I might, I should particularly like to thank the President of Chile for the constructive way in which he approached this issue.
Yes, there were debates about the length of the ultimatum, but the basic construct was gathering support. Then, on Monday night, France said that it would veto a second resolution, whatever the circumstances. Then France denounced the six tests. Later that day, Iraq rejected them. Still, we continued to negotiate, even at that point.
Last Friday, France said that it could not accept any resolution with an ultimatum in it. On Monday, we made final efforts to secure agreement. However, the fact is that France remains utterly opposed to anything that lays down an ultimatum authorising action in the event of non-compliance by Saddam.
I realize not everyone likes to read Hansard, and I certainly didn’t when I was at law school. Perhaps this excerpt from later on might be more useful and it is the crux of the international disagreement. The Prime Minister outlined his position on resolution 1441:
It is correct that resolution 1441 did not say that there would be another resolution authorising the use of force, but the implication of resolution 1441—it was stated in terms—was that if Iraq continued in material breach, defined as not co-operating fully, immediately and unconditionally, serious consequences should follow. All we are asking for in the second resolution is the clear ultimatum that if Saddam continues to fail to co-operate, force should be used. The French position is that France will vote no, whatever the circumstances. Those are not my words, but those of the French President. I find it sad that at this point in time he cannot support us in the position we have set out, which is the only sure way to disarm Saddam. And what, indeed, would any tyrannical regime possessing weapons of mass destruction think when viewing the history of the world's diplomatic dance with Saddam over these 12 years? That our capacity to pass firm resolutions has only been matched by our feebleness in implementing them. That is why this indulgence has to stop—because it is dangerous: dangerous if such regimes disbelieve us; dangerous if they think they can use our weakness, our hesitation, and even the natural urges of our democracy towards peace against us; and dangerous because one day they will mistake our innate revulsion against war for permanent incapacity, when, in fact, if pushed to the limit, we will act. But when we act, after years of pretence, the action will have to be harder, bigger, more total in its impact. It is true that Iraq is not the only country with weapons of mass destruction, but I say this to the House: back away from this confrontation now, and future conflicts will be infinitely worse and more devastating in their effects.
I do believe Mr Blair was right in his last sentence, because Saddam Hussein would have armed Iraq more and more.
We know history has shown us that there gaffes along the way with a loss of many lives, Coalition and Iraqi, but from the point of view of international law, the above outlines pretty well why the war began: a breach of resolution 1441. This was also why Congress voted yes to attacking Iraq, not the reasons now given by certain politicians.
As I wrote in an earlier post on the subject, countries have taken two positions on the resolution: the US–UK one, which says 1441 must be enforced if the UN Security Council is to save any face; and the French one, which required a second resolution authorizing force (but which it said it would veto). Countries like New Zealand took the latter position.
I make no judgement on which is right and which is wrong here.
Certain American presidential candidates need to level with the American people on why they are changing their minds about the Iraq war. The reasons I have heard from the likes of Sen. Clinton are so far fabrications at worst, and the result of a poor memory at best.
Sen. Clinton voted to enforce a UN Security Council resolution, just as her husband did in Kosovo, without a second resolution.
She needs to tell the American people why her position on enforcing international law has now changed and I see nothing wrong if she merely fronted up with her rationale.
As I said in the comments to that earlier post, I do not mind the anti-war brigade or the anti-war rhetoric of the US Democratic Party as long as their arguments are founded in truth. There are strong arguments against going into Iraq backed by many nations, but it is very odd that they are not used; instead, Bush- and troop-bashing seem to be the norm. That makes me question their motives and it makes me rather sad for those who believe their arguments: what they do is divide a country and hurt us all.
Whether you support the war in Iraq or you don’t—and here in New Zealand we have the luxury to criticize the United States—David Horowitz’s recollection (video found originally on Humbled Infidel’s blog) of why the US went in certainly correlates with my own. It’s why I have always held back attacking President George W. Bush, because faced with what he had in front of him, I cannot honestly say I would not have done the same thing. As Horowitz reveals, neither would Al Gore, who supported Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech in 2002.
The end of this video (cut short) goes into the rationale for war surrounding UN Security Council resolution 1441, which PM Tony Blair managed to sell to Parliament—but which, I always felt, the US was less successful at doing. There are legal arguments there based on the UN Charter but it was always about 1441.
This is one of the problems I tend to have with the US Democratic Party, for all my own left-leaning tendencies. Right now, for example, constituents are begging the super-delegates that they should not select who will best beat Sen. John McCain and the Republicans, but who represents their position. The fact this question has even arisen is disturbing: as representatives of the people of course one should represent the citizens. The minute you do not, you do not have a democracy: it is a quest for power among élites ignoring the citizenry, the sort of thing people were getting away from when the US was founded.
I am not saying that the GOP wouldn’t look after its own, but given that they have fielded men like Sen. Bob Dole—who from a marketing perspective was a tough sell against President Clinton—it seems that it might be more willing to represent its base than look at seizing power. The 42nd president gifted them the Monica Lewinsky situation, which hurt the Democrats. I would say that they never forgave the GOP or Kenneth Starr who were steadfast in their condemnation and investigation. That power-hungriness from the Democrats is very apparent in the way the Bush administration has been undermined in the last eight years.
The consequences of Resolution 1441 were always clear but the means of acting upon them were less so because of the way the UN Charter is written, and that ambiguity effectively gave some countries a chance of opting out. Our PM took it, as did the leaders of many other nations. It is respectful, even if she later made a gaffe about how she did not think a Gore presidency would have gone to war. (As Horowitz reminds us, that is probably an incorrect position.) They believed that an extra resolution was needed before war; the US, UK, Australia and others did not.
The Democratic Party and the anti-war movement probably think that this is all too tough to sell to the public, so they engage in other tactics, shaming US troops or the administration and pressuring those who have short memories to join their cause. I am not saying that what they have uncovered is all untrue—of course I accept there are dodgy dealings surrounding the war and I even accept some misconduct—but they’d earn my respect if they didn’t flip-flop or cover up the truth. Sen. Clinton, who voted for the war, who voted for the increase in expenditure alongside Sen. John Kerry, is one of those very high-profile politicians who has changed depending on the trade winds of public opinion.
Of course a senator or a future president must be representative but she must also stand on truth. ‘I was wrong to have supported the war because …’ would have been a good start. ‘Now the American people are telling me that it is time to withdraw our troops.
‘My support was founded on the belief that resolution 1441 was inviolable. It was not, and we have carried out the due punishment needed on Saddam Hussein’s régime.’
There are millions of ways to spin it, especially ways to do it without demoralizing the young men and women serving in Iraq—and I am not even a politician.
This would also mean she’d have to go against her husband’s attacks on Kosovo, which also did not have that additional Security Council resolution but was a preemptive strike by the US. George W. Bush is not alone, just that the media give him more grief over it.
But a mea culpa is not flip-flopping and it is not pandering. It is being honest, something the Beltway sees very rarely.
What concerns me, however, is that the road to war is a serious matter. It should not be so easily bent because the decision should be founded on principle—and if those principles existed after resolution 1441 was broken then they exist today. Congress voted for the war, with bipartisan support. There needs to be a far bigger shift for any US representative to say no to the war now—so what is it?
A poor entry strategy, a poor exit strategy, the belief that the US’s only task was to oust Saddam Hussein, the belief that the parameters of the original declaration of war have been fulfilled—what? Certainly Sen. Clinton needs to tell us.
She has said that she would not have voted for the war if she knew there were no WMDs. But as Horowitz points out, the existence of WMDs was not the basis for war. Did Sen. Clinton “misspeak” again?
There is a popular notion that that was what resolution 1441 was all about and we all remember Sec. Powell’s Powerpoint presentations to the UN.
But unless Sen. Clinton has misremembered this incident as well, resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002 was about Iraq’s non-compliance with conditions laid down by the international community over disarmament, which included WMDs, but they were not the core issue.
When Iraq lied about what it did with its WMDs, which the international community confirmed it had as late as 1998, the US took a hard line.
Iraq itself never offered an explanation on the discrepancy between its claims and tests by the inspectors.
That was one legal justification for the US and the UK, and, skipping over a few issues, the war began.
I sure wish the US politicians would just tell the truth about the vote at that time because they should have a better understanding of it, having been there—rather than let people like me catch them out.
This is another reason to not dislike Bush: he said he would stay the course, so he did. The majority of Americans voted for him in 2004 (regardless of whether one is counting the electoral college or the popular vote) and knew this full well. And while I think some of his spending has sent that US deficit soaring, he has stayed firm on his belief in his tax cuts. He seems content because he thinks he is protecting the Constitution and that he needs to continue his strategy. Maybe that is the Bush world-view. (He saw how his Dad got burned on the ‘No new taxes’ and learned from it. He saw how his Dad lost the support of the right wing of the GOP and learned from it. And he saw how he was criticized for being too smart when he ran for Congress—which is where the folksy public image comes from. Welcome to Bushland.)
Had the war successfully concluded people would praise him on his steadfastness.
For if a leader bends based on the trade winds, then will she bend based on pressure from other sovereign nations? If Saudi Arabia put pressure to bear on the US, would Sen. Clinton cave in? If a communist nation put pressure on Sen. Obama, would he? Or, for that matter, how far will Sen. McCain bend to foreign pressure?
We cannot turn back the clock now and see how the message could have been better communicated to the US. We should know, from the Horowitz video, why the US went in and understand who is now lying to the American public: that is important. For all his failings in everything from the Patriot Act (which I am no fan of, and it has restricted the movement of people who could benefit the US) to the Alberto González judicial appointments, I do not think it was President Bush. I have never called him a bare-faced liar.
The next presidential election is a chance to address those failings. The economy can be fixed but what is in dire need of repair are the values to which not only Americans want moral leadership, but most of us in the western world. Get the values right, get the truth right, and the rest will follow.
At the end of the day I care not if the president is a Democrat or a Republican, and I have no say in it anyway, as long as our common values are restored and preserved, and the leader is truthful. And that the decision for staying the course or withdrawing is also founded on truth.
Here’s an Autocade series for the Brits. Remember these? Well, maybe all but the last one. I haven’t put in the data for the MG ZR yet though.
Triumph Acclaim. 1981–4 (prod. 133,625). 4-door saloon. F/F, 1335 cm³ (4 cyl. SOHC). Anglicized version of Honda Ballade, made on the BL production lines at Cowley. Notable as one of the first Japanese designs to be built within the EEC, to bypass the gentlemen’s agreement where Japan limited itself to an 11 per cent share of the European market. Cramped in the rear compared with rivals. Limited-edition Avon Acclaims with more equipment and turbocharger; CD trim model later added as luxury version. Last Triumph car.
Rover 213/Rover 216. 1984–90 (prod. 418,367). 4-door saloon. F/F, 1342, 1598 cm³ (4 cyl. SOHC). Nicknamed ‘SD3’ or ‘Ronda’, successor to Triumph Acclaim followed the same formula: begin with a Honda Ballade. This time, Rover input was greater, evident on the cars themselves, which looked more distinctive. Reliable, advanced for its time thanks to 1·3 unit, slightly less up with the play with 1·6 derived from old Austin Maxi unit but still economical. Intended to be a niche player but had very healthy sales in comparison with other Austin Rover products of the time. Facelift in 1987 including revisions that Honda itself adopted for its Civic and Ballade.
Rover 214/Rover 216/Rover 218/Rover 220 (R8). 1989–98 (prod. 708,003). 3- and 5-door saloon, 2-door convertible, 2-door coupé. F/F, 1396 , 1590 cm³ petrol, 1769, 1905 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. OHC), 1588, 1590, 1994 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC). Twin to Honda Concerto with even greater Austin Rover input than prior Rover 200 series, and probably the company’s most competitive range against ageing Ford Escort and even newer rivals such as Fiat Tipo. Some diesels sold with Honda badges but Rover bodywork. Cabriolet from 1992. Three-door launched 1992 with more powerful versions competing as a hot hatch; two-door coupé, codenamed Tomcat, well regarded as a performance derivative, from 1993. Two facelifts, including 1994 one grafting on formal Rover grille. Saloons deleted with launch of R3, but coupé and convertible carried on to 1998 without 200 name.
Rover 200/Rover 214/Rover 216/Rover 220SD (R3). 1995–9 (prod. 470,449). 3- and 5-door saloon. F/F, 1396, 1589, 1796 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC), 1994 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. OHC). Originally designed as a replacement for Metro, but BMW and Rover nudged it upmarket where it was a premium product and rather expensive for its size. Smaller than former Rover 200 due to its Metro-replacing origins and cheaply developed at £200 million. Attractive David Saddington-styled car with ideas above its station, promoted by Sting on TV, aimed at the 20-somethings. As an Escort or Golf competitor, far too cramped. Most cars soon badged 200, regardless of engine size. Limited-edition BRM in 1998. Successor was eventually brought down to earth and sold in the Fiesta class.
Rover 25. 1999–2004 (prod. 217,620 all 25 incl. Mk II). 3- and 5-door saloon. F/F, 1120 cm³ (4 cyl. SOHC), 1120, 1396, 1588, 1795 cm³ petrol (4 cyl. DOHC), 1994 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. OHC). BMW-influenced facelift for 1995 Rover 200, designed to keep the car current till replacement ready in the 21st century—sadly, that never came. Repositioned lower in the market-place with price adjusted, making 25 seem better value. Introduction of Streetwise “soft-roader”: a 25 with cladding pretending to be an off-roader, but which had the same FWD transmission as others. Laughed at then, but now Volkswagen, Ford, Citroën, Peugeot and others offer similar cars.
Rover 25. 2004–5 (prod. 217,620 all 25 from 1999). 3- and 5-door saloon. F/F, 1120 cm³ (4 cyl. SOHC), 1120, 1396, 1588, 1795 cm³ petrol (4 cyl. DOHC), 1994 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. OHC). Facelift and new interior—and last hurrah—for British-made 25, codenamed Jewel. Packaging dated but car still fairly handsome and reasonably good value. Streetwise faux off-roader continued. Lasted till April 2005 when MG Rover went into administration, and tooling now owned by Red Chinese state.
MG 3 SW. 2007 to date (prod. unknown). 5-door sedan. F/F, 1396, 1795 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC). Subcompact crossover developed from Rover Streetwise. MG 3 SW (for Streetwise, not Station Wagon) a front-wheel-drive model with Rover 200 platform from 1995, made in Nanjing, China from 2007 after a two-year hiatus caused by MG Rover’s collapse. New to buyers in Red China, where most are sold.
Warning: this may be the most boring Autocade-related post you will ever read on Vox. Yes, ladies and gentlemen, I give you the Toyota Corolla. I am not responsible for narcolepsy.
I wrote these ones out of interest, tracking the rise and fall of one of Japan’s greatest exports. I say ‘fall’ despite the fact Toyota has sold 30 million of this nameplate, as it does seem that in an age of market segmentation, it is branching the Corolla line into other nameplates such as the Auris, Blade and Matrix models. So Toyota will still sell huge numbers of these cars-as-domestic-appliances, and it will even instil desirability into them through marketing, and it will likely remain the world’s number-one automaker. But the age of the Corolla may be in decline, with fewer body styles and engine options, as you go down the list—following the same pattern that we can observe with any car line. We are probably 75 per cent through the lifetime of the Corolla. (Note to our US readers: the years quoted are not American model years.)
Toyota Corolla (E10). 1966–70 (prod. 1,170,000 approx.). 2- and 4-door sedan, 2-door coupé, 3-door wagon. F/R, 1077, 1166 cm³ (4 cyl. OHV). The car that kicked it off. Toyota spotted room for a small car as the Japanese middle class grew. Very conventional, drum brakes initially, front discs later. Perhaps established the idea for the Corolla line that basic motoring sells—it need not be the latest technology—but how that appealed to a global market. Aimed at export, toward a ‘general user’. Some creature comforts such as cigarette lighter, reclining seats, two-speed wipers. Four-door and wagon added May 1967. Coupé, from April 1968, sold as Sprinter in some markets—Sprinter line had not split from Corolla line at this point. Larger engine from 1970.
Toyota Corolla (E20). 1970–8 (prod. 3,210,000 approx.). 2- and 4-door sedan, 2-door coupé, 3- and 5-door van and wagon. F/R, 1166, 1407, 1588 cm³ (4 cyl. OHV), 1588 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC). Launched May 1970, Coke-bottled shape follow-up to original Corolla, proving a bigger hit. Bigger all round, with sporty looking coupé and attractive (for the time) sedan. Conventional engineering but fairly good equipment levels. Addition of five-door station wagon for first time. Sprinter line split from Corolla with this series: cars were called Toyota Corolla for dealers bearing that name, and Toyota Sprinter for Toyota Auto dealers in Japan. Five-speed transmission for 1971. Corolla Levin (and Sprinter Trueno) from March 1972. Daihatsu Charmant spun off from Corolla E20 platform in November 1974, after this model was mostly superseded by Corolla 30. Vans and wagons continued in Japan to 1978 alongside Corolla 30 counterparts.
Toyota Corolla/Corolla 30 (E30, E50). 1974–81 (prod. 4,420,000 approx.). 2- and 4-door sedan, 2-door hardtop coupé, 3-door liftback coupé, 3- and 5-door wagon. F/R, 1166, 1290, 1588 cm³ (4 cyl. OHV), 1588 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC). Japanese econobox and the world’s top selling car from 1974 to 1977—the first generation of Corolla to win this acclaim. Not the most rust-proof and not particularly safe when compared with its contemporaries, but inoffensive though dull. Less roomy than Volkswagen Golf; cruder than contemporary Nissans, but proof that conventional engineering was what the customer wanted in the 1970s. Many variations on the theme: two sedans, two coupés, two wagons. Toyota Sprinter a more powerful version; related to Daihatsu Charmant. Longer life than most Corollas, probably due to 1970s’ recession. Japanese and American models had raised grille, lacking from many other markets. More formal grille for 1977. Production in Japan stopped in 1979; Australia produced the model at Port Melbourne till 1981, with later models featuring a 1290 cm³ four.
Toyota Corolla (E70). 1979–87 (prod. 3,500,000 approx. in Japan). 2- and 4-door sedan, 3-door van, 5-door station wagon, 2-door coupé, 3-door fastback coupé, 3-door hatchback coupé. F/R, 1290, 1495, 1770 cm³ (4 cyl. OHV), 1490, 1587 cm³ (4 cyl. SOHC), 1587 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC). Boxy Toyota for the 1980s looks modern but hides pretty much the same as before: front-engined, rear-wheel drive. Available in a variety of models and tidily styled, but a demonstration of the car as a domestic appliance in most cases. Behind the times once archrival Nissan released its front-drive Sunny for 1981. Van and station wagon built into E80 era with slanted grille; facelifted rear-drive sedans even built in Australia into 1987.
Toyota Corolla (E80). 1983–7 (prod. 3,300,000 approx.). 4-door sedan, 5-door liftback sedan, 3- and 5-door hatchback sedan, 3- and 5-door van and station wagon, 2- and 3-door coupé. F/F, F/R, F/A, 1295, 1587 cm³ (4 cyl. SOHC), 1587 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC), 1839 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. OHC). Toyota may have been late compared with Nissan, Ford, Mazda and Honda in joining the front-wheel-drive bandwagon, but when the E80 Corolla was launched, it blew a lot of the competition away. Highly competent range dynamically and models even had character; relative to the competition, probably the best Corolla ever. Comprehensive range but station wagon and vans carried over from E70 and Levin (AE86) coupé and liftback still on old rear-wheel-drive platform. Sixteen-valve engines for AE86s, developing 92 kW; AE86s developed a legendary status in Japan, considered a classic to this day. Pop-up headlamps for some coupés. Styling completely contemporary with exception of van and wagon, which had an E80-style nose grafted on. Handsome liftback, named Corolla Seca in Australia, where E80 production commenced 1985. Kammback three- and five-door models part of Corolla range in most countries though considered separately in Japan, US and Canada as Corolla FX, Corolla Compact in Europe. New Zealand FXes had regular Corolla nose; other markets tended to have Japanese one. First Toyota Corolla to top New Zealand sales’ charts, thanks to marketing blitz with That’s Incredible’s John Davison.
Toyota Corolla (E90). 1987–91 (prod. 4,500,000 approx.). 4-door sedan, 5-door liftback sedan, 2- and 3-door coupé, 5-door wagon, 5-door 4WD wagon, 3- and 5-door hatchback sedan. F/F, F/A, 1295 cm³ petrol, 1839 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. SOHC), 1498, 1587 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC). Bigger, plusher second-generation front-wheel-drive Corolla built on the last’s success, though seemingly less inspiring. Aim was to produce a classless car, and in Japan, it succeeded; in Europe, with other compacts growing, the Corolla never really transcended its position. Same wheelbase, but 2 cm wider. More sophisticated with four-wheel-drive models; Corolla Cielo (Seca in Australia) a contemporary-looking five-door liftback. Rear-wheel-drive models phased out as Toyota introduced a proper E90 station wagon, though commercial models retained leaf springs at rear. Four-wheel-drive wagon replaced Tercel Carib in most markets, different body to standard wagon. Station wagon shared with Sprinter line. Kammbacks still separate line in Japan, called Corolla FX.
Toyota Corolla (E100). 1991–9 (prod. unknown). 4-door sedan, 5-door liftback sedan, 4-door hardtop, 3- and 5-door hatchback sedan, 5-door wagon, 5-door high-roof van, 2-door coupé. F/F, F/A, 1331, 1497, 1498, 1587, 1762 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC), 1296 cm³ petrol, 1974 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. SOHC). Dr Akihiko Saito, in charge of the Corolla programme, wanted to create the most refined Corolla possible, with Lexus-style comfort. To some degree, the team succeeded, but the car’s price went up in Japan during a recession. Roomy, but heavy, and less competitive alongside other small cars, including Koreans. Sales were initially slow. Longer wheelbase. Short-tail hatchbacks still Corolla FX in Japan. Four-door hardtop coupé from 1992 called Corolla Ceres. Last Corolla built in Australia.
Toyota Corolla (E110). 1995–2000 (prod. unknown). 3-door hatchback sedan, 4-door sedan, 5-door liftback sedan, 5-door wagon, 2-door coupé, 5-door minivan. F/F, F/A, 1331, 1498, 1587, 1794 cm³ petrol (4 cyl. DOHC), 1974, 2184 cm³ diesel (4 cyl.). Economic recession forced Toyota to use carryover platform from E100 and split Corolla into Asian–North American and Australasian–European–South American editions. More formal styling was apparent for the former; the latter had distinctive grilles. Wheelbase remained unchanged, and doors carried over as well. Kammback five-door deleted as five-door models merged into one body style. Sprinter Carib-style shell used for European station wagon (E100 carried over in Japan). Corolla more outclassed in this generation, especially with cost-cutting—though Takayasu Honda, the chief engineer on the project, tried to do so without losing quality. Mini-MPV called Corolla Spacio (Corolla Verso in Europe) introduced. European trim levels sounded more emotive, with Linea Terra and Linea Rossa introduced in this generation. Built on every continent at one point, a true world car. Japanese mid-term facelift April 1997; European facelift to four-headlamp grille 1998.
Toyota Corolla/Toyota Huaguan/Toyota Limo (E120). 2000–8 (prod. unknown). 3-, 4- and 5-door sedan, 5-door wagon, 5-door minivan. F/F, 1364 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. SOHC), 1398, 1598, 1796 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC), 1995 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. DOHC). Corolla grows to its biggest size up to that point but limited by Japanese taxation requirements (setting the maximum width to 1,700 mm before it goes into a higher tax bracket). Shortened Toyota Vista platform, 2,600 mm wheelbase. Torsion beam axle at rear, replacing independent rear suspension. Sedans sold as Corolla Altis in some Asian markets. Wagons named Corolla Fielder, with hatchbacks taking Corolla Runx and Allex names (the latter replacing Sprinter). Corolla Spacio denoted a minivan model, sold as Corolla Spacio in Europe. Toyota Matrix, a different small van or tall hatchback, sold in US, renamed Corolla Matrix in 2005. Platform shared with Pontiac Vibe (or Toyota Voltz). Competent small car, hatchbacks in fact quite stylish, though interior design dull. Mid-life facelift 2004 in Japan. Japanese production ended 2006; some other countries 2008.
Toyota Corolla (E140). 2006 to date (prod. unknown). 4-door sedan, 5-door wagon, 5-door minivan. F/F, F/A, 1497, 1797 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC). Corolla grew to a size where the 1,700 mm width was too narrow for export, so Toyota broke up the ranges into related cars: sub-1,700 mm for domestic, over 1,700 mm for export. E140 sedan known as Corolla Axio in Japan. Wagon (Corolla Fielder) sold Japan and New Zealand only. Wheelbase unchanged from E120. Corolla Rumion a boxy minivan related to Scion xB and Daihatsu Materia.
Toyota Corolla (E150). 2006 to date (prod. unknown). 4-door sedan. F/F, 1497, 1797, 2362 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC). Continuing car-as-domestic-appliance approach with bland styling, if reasonable refinement. Hatchback for Australia and New Zealand really a rebadged Toyota Auris. Interiors better than E120. Different to 1,700 mm-wide model sold in Japan as Toyota divides Corolla into domestic and export models. Sedan badged Corolla Altis in many Asian markets. Wagon part of E140 range, rather than wider E150. Five-door for US market sold as Toyota Matrix.
Wouldn’t it be fun to look for cars called 600? Maybe not. I know I have missed the Fiat 600 and the BMW 600 (remember when BMW made bubble cars that make the Smart ForTwo look huge?) but how about these with the same name? These are all from Autocade.
Mercedes-Benz 600
Mercedes-Benz 600. 1963–81 (prod. 2,677). 4-door saloon, 4- and 6-door stretch limousine, 4- and 6-door landaulet. F/R, 6330 cm³ (V8 SOHC). Largest Mercedes offered at the time, meant to be an example of the ultimate in German engineering. Hydraulic power for many features, including opening boot and automatic doors. Adjustable air suspension. Customers included the Pope as well as numerous dictators (Mao Tse-Tung, Idi Amin, Nicolae Ceauşescu, Kim Il-Sung). Not directly replaced, though 450 SEL 6·9 did its best; Maybach 57 and 63 probably the closest to a direct successor.
Saab 600
Saab–Lancia 600. 1981–6 (prod. unknown). 5-door hatchback. F/F, 1499 cm³ (4 cyl.). Scandinavian interpretation of Lancia Delta, the result of a distribution agreement with Fiat that also included the Autobianchi A112 (sold in Sweden, as most of Europe, as the Lancia A112). The 600 was sold in Sweden and Norway only with the 1·5-litre engine in three trims. Some trim differences to “Saabify” original car, including grille and Saab typeface on badging.
Dodge 600
Dodge 600. 1983–8 (prod. 309,590). 4-door sedan, 2-door convertible. F/F, 2213, 2507, 2555 cm³ (4 cyl. OHC). Stretched K-car, twin of Chrysler E-class. ES model marketed as a sports sedan that could rival Mercedes W123 and BMW 5-series. Never managed to, but very good alternative to Pontiac 6000 and other GM A-cars. Considered roomy, well sized for mid-size car buyers, and helped Chrysler restore its fortunes in the early 1980s. Convertible actually a rebadged Dodge 400, i.e. K-car, sold from 1984 on shorter wheelbase. Mitsubishi 2555 cm³ engine deleted after 1985 model year; convertibles had 2507 cm³ option in final year, 1986. ES replaced in 1986; SE trim introduced.
Rover 600
Rover 618/Rover 620/Rover 623. 1993–9 (prod. 270,988). 4-door saloon. F/F, 1850, 1997 cm³ petrol, 1994 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. OHC), 1994 cm³ turbo, 2259 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC). Rebodied Honda Accord, sharing front windscreen, doors and roof with Japanese car. Many interior elements identical. Usual Honda dynamics of sophisticated suspension in low, sporting design. Designed by Rover team at Honda; Richard Woolley styling has British overtones.
Here’s one for the American Voxers from Autocade: a mid-1960s muscle car from the days when Mercurys were a bit more than Fords with lipstick.
Mercury S-55
Mercury S-55. 1966 (prod. 2,916 hardtop, 669 convertible). 2-door hardtop, 2-door convertible. F/R, 428 in³ (V8). Originally a part of the Monterey range, S-55 “muscle car” (428 in³ quoted at 405 hp) returned in 1966 after two-year absence as a separate line. Lincoln Continental-type styling. Very rare. Independence was short-lived: S-55, with slightly different styling, went back to Monterey range in 1967 (and proved rarer still).
Manufacturing location: St Louis, Missouri, USA
I didn’t paste the plant information before, but it does exist for most entries.
I’ve inputted some information into Autocade over the last half-hour about the Rover 75*, a model that saw the end of volume British-owned car manufacturing—and which might mean the beginning of two marques in Red China. Here I chart the history of this tragic car, beset by publicity gaffes from BMW and a British press with its claws out, only for it to begin making good produced in Shanghai and Nanjing. Even in Italy it won an award for the most beautiful car when it launched, but the Brits never warmed to the 75. Summary: fairly timeless look, but I still wouldn’t buy one due to quality concerns.
* It took many times longer to copy and paste this into Vox (hours!) than writing and researching all of the below, due to the site crashing my browser due to a script error constantly!
Rover 75. 1998–2004 (prod. 169,250, 1998–2003). 4-door saloon, 4-door LWB saloon, 5-door estate. F/F, 1794 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC), 1997, 2497 cm³ (V6 DOHC), 1951 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. DOHC). Retro-themed and too-English Rover styled by Richard Woolley, with lavish use of chrome. Soft ride to distinguish it from BMW cars. Very robust, refined car but never appealed to enthusiasts; suffered from BMW’s indecision on and changes to marketing from launch day onwards, as well as British media apathy. Related MG ZT from 2001, after production shifted to Longbridge for all models following BMW sale of Rover. LWB saloon brought back Vanden Plas tag temporarily.
MG ZT. 2001–4 (prod. 27,149 all models, incl. Mk II). 4-door saloon, 5-door estate. F/F, 1794 cm³ petrol, 1951 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. DOHC), 2497 cm³ (V6 DOHC). Sporting versions of Rover 75, finally with firmer suspension and better handling. Helped keep MG Rover numbers up for a short time, though package began looking more dated toward the end of the run. V8 model introduced 2003, covered separately.
MG ZT 260
MG ZT 260. 2003–5 (prod. 883 incl. Rover 75 V8). 4-door saloon, 5-door estate. F/R 4601 cm³ (V8 SOHC). MG Rover, on a shoestring budget, sourced a new V8 engine from Ford and, in order to get it working, changed the standard 75 platform to rear-wheel drive. Prodrive did the initial work; MG Rover brought it in-house. Hairy, raw car, in line with MG image, and with few visual cues to signify the larger engine other than badging and four exhausts. Facelift one year in, in 2004; automatics introduced toward end of run (bound to be rarest of all), but production came to an end in 2005, with no Chinese equivalent.
Rover 75 Mk II
Rover 75. 2004–5 (prod. unknown). 4-door saloon, 4-door LWB saloon, 5-door estate. F/F, 1794 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC), 1997, 2497 cm³ (V6 DOHC), 1951 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. DOHC). Essentially carryover technology from Mk I with cosmetic facelift, while Project Drive eliminated certain parts deemed unnecessary to cut costs, which meant less refinement on some models. Never had its full run as MG Rover collapsed and the 75 found its rights sold to SAIC of China. V8 model introduced in 2004, covered separately. LWB model simply called Limousine, rather than Vanden Plas, for these final years.
MG ZT. 2004–5 (prod. 27,149 all models, incl. Mk I). 4-door saloon, 5-door estate. F/F, 1794 cm³ petrol, 1951 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. DOHC), 2497 cm³ (V6 DOHC). Facelifted ZT with minor changes, but no real mechanical changes—and no real improvement to sales. Production shifted to Nanjing, China after collapse of MG Rover in UK, restarted in 2007.
Rover 75 V8. 2004–5 (prod. 883 incl. MG ZT 260). 4-door saloon, 4-door LWB saloon. F/R, 4601 cm³ (V8 SOHC). Short-lived Ford V8-powered version of 75, with platform re-engineered by Prodrive and Rover to rear-wheel drive. Front grille, supposedly inspired by Rover P5B, controversial at the time, accused of copying Audi, and designer’s name not released by MG Rover. No direct predecessor—last hairy Rover V8 was SD1 Vitesse in 1980s. Good performance but car seemed heavy; interior and insulation kept English club-lounge feel. Fuel economy in the high 10s, low 20s (mpg).
Roewe 750. 2006 to date (prod. unknown). F/F, 1794 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC), 2497 cm³ (V6 DOHC). Rebodied Rover 75. SAIC acquired the rights to the model in 2005 and proceeded to make its own version on the long-wheelbase platform. British consultants Ricardo did restyle and update. However, SAIC was forced to create a new marque, Roewe, after Ford bought the Rover brand that they wanted; hence, Roewe logo has the same shape as old Rover Viking longship one. Two noses: small grille for lower-spec; large grille (à la last Rover 75 V8) for higher-spec. Not as well built as old 75 according to early reports, with less safety equipment than western markets expect.
MG 7
MG 7. 2007 to date (prod. 13,000 approx.). 4-door sedan, 4-door LWB sedan. F/F, 1794 cm³ (4 cyl. DOHC), 2497 cm³ (V6 DOHC). Chinese edition of MG ZT, offered with both Mk I and II grilles contemporaneously. Engines upgraded to comply with latest Euro IV legislation, and quality said to be better than those of the cars coming off Longbridge in 2005 thanks to new factory at Nanjing. Improved specification. No estate announced. Played heavily on MG’s heritage when launched.
The reasons I haven’t been fully supportive of John McCain have largely been from GOP-voting friends who have met him. They speak of a man who seems empty with a cold handshake. McCain supporters might say that that is a sign of a man who hates political functions and prefers getting on with the job. I guess it could be seen both ways.
He has been the butt of my own jokes. On television a couple of years ago, I asked the audience, ‘So what party is this guy with again? I can never tell.’ There has been a perception of McCain being not conservative enough and even in the lead-up to his party’s nomination for the presidency there were members of the religious right who felt the senator from Arizona could not possibly be their guy. Hence, former Gov. Mike Huckabee looked more palatable to them; while the technocrats could not fathom anyone like Huckabee getting the nomination.
Examine McCain’s record and he’s a pretty consistent conservative, from his time in Congress (where he was a supporter of Ronald Reagan), so this perception may have been an invention of the media and his opponents. Remember, when he and George W. Bush were battling it out in 2000, things got dirty as both ran attack ads. McCain came off pretty terribly.
In fact, when I looked at McCain’s record today I am not too sure why there may be some liberal support for him, although he might be able to use that to his advantage with the voting public. Unless people like George W. Bush have been even more staunchly conservative and have offended those liberals.
While voting for the War on Terror Sen. McCain also had amendments to bills added, such as ensuring that the US did not engage in illegal torture of its PoWs. That is easily explained: if you were beaten up and tortured yourself over a five-and-a-half year period, you’d be pretty averse to seeing another human being go through the same thing.
I write of him now not because I have suddenly picked up a GOP baton and figured he’s the best choice for President, but because he hasn’t really had any time in the limelight.
The media are chanting either Obama or Clinton, although more seem to be wondering why Hillary Clinton is still in the race. She must either know she’s a fading cause célèbre, or the Clinton fear-mongering tentacles of Arkancide run deeper in the MSM than we can give them credit. Unless she has a genuine chance, prepared to come on stream if something happens to Obama.
I have written about Barack Obama on this blog because being a minority I want to redress the balance of some of the racist tendencies of some MSM coverage. Politically I do not agree with him any more than I agree with many of the contenders for their parties’ nominations. From memory most of the candidates have a 60 to 70 per cent similarity with my views, which makes you wonder if they are just all saying the right things.
I feel similarly when I defend John McCain. He is the subject of less media coverage (which is the bias here), and he is the subject of ageism as America goes around with this notion that only a younger person can be a dynamic president.
This is not just a US phenomenon: the west loves the idea of a young, glamorous leader.
The US’s finest hours have come from experienced, wise presidents, backed up by strong and wise first ladies. JFK did not live long enough, in my view, to have given the country a “finest hour” in his presidency, though he was inspiring; historical presidents such as Adams, Lincoln, Hoover and FDR were hardly young men.
In this election, Americans need to consider not just the candidate’s stated position but what their past says about their characters—not what the MSM, attack ads and campaign lies say.
They need to strip away the biases of age, race and gender as each principal candidate has suffered from prejudice of one sort or the other.
They need to examine McCain’s 27 years in elected office, without the rhetoric, just as they need to examine Obama’s 12 and Clinton’s eight. (If Obama is inexperienced, according to Clinton, then what does that make her?) And if we are to consider Clinton’s time as First Lady of the country and of Arkansas as she wishes us to, then the record of Lt Cmdr McCain and later Capt McCain needs to be considered, too.
Because the next four years are not about trying to restore Camelot in the White House: they are about putting a person in the White House that can only preach honour but has shown it.
Whether you are a Republican or a Democrat, what we foreigners want to see is trustworthy leadership. Honour begins at home, and who do you want saying, ‘The buck stops here’?
If voters dislike spin then who has offered the least spin, the candidate on whom you can rely most? Or that other countries can rely on most: that America’s enemies will know their days are numbered, that America’s allies will know they have a real friend, and that those who fell out with America know that the nation will in fact consistently and genuinely stand for freedom and liberty?
Men like me were brought up to admire the US for its service to humanity and freedom, and its opposition to Communism, and we want to admire it again. It should not be a country perceived as slogan-heavy and substance-free, yet the perception has shifted toward this since the 1960s. A candidate who resorts to such techniques does not necessarily fit in the 2008 scene and, sadly, that is how I perceive Sen. Clinton. If McCain is really a maverick, then he might shake things up as much as people hope Obama will.
This should be a race between McCain and Obama, and the next months, hopefully, will reveal it is just that.