Jack Yan on Vox

On the horizon

nobody@vox.com(Jack Yan) — Sat, 07 Jun 2008 16:26:36 +1200

Here’s another car some of you may remember from Autocade—and for American readers, you may have even had one, or had a friend who owned one as a first car.
Developed by Chrysler Europe and also adapted for the US, it was supposedly a “world car”, though it never sold in the Asia–Pacific (other than French territories) and the parts between the European and American editions weren’t even interchangeable. But it was a good entry-level model for Chrysler US for many years, even if it was based on an ancient (albeit lengthened and widened) Simca 1100 floorpan from the 1960s. European buyers loved it initially, especially after a Car of the Year win for 1978–9, then realized there were more modern and less rust-prone small cars around.

Chrysler–Simca Horizon/Chrysler Horizon (C2/L-body). 1977–9 (prod. 430,225 incl. all of 1979, incl. Talbot). 5-door saloon. F/F, 1118, 1294, 1442 cm³ petrol (4 cyl. OHV). In many ways a rebodied Simca 1100, but despite dated origins on widened and lengthened ﬂoorpan, still voted European Car of the Year 1978–9. Fairly good handling and ride, but less than competent steering and on the heavy side. Certainly not an all-rounder as award might have suggested. Attractive styling from Chrysler’s Whitley centre under Roy Axe, similar to Dodge Omni and Plymouth Horizon. Simca name used only on Continent: car was always Chrysler Horizon in UK from its 1978 launch. Early appearance of a trip computer on this model. Rebadged Talbot–Simca in July 1979 on the Continent; simply Talbot in UK.

Dodge Omni (L-body). 1978–90 (prod. unknown). 5-door sedan. F/F, 1594, 1716, 2212 cm³ (4 cyl. OHC). North American version of Chrysler–Simca Horizon, developed in UK and France initially. US version ultimately had little in common with European models aside from overall styling due to adaptation to local tastes. Considered fashionable at the beginning and acknowledged as the ﬁrst response to Volkswagen Golf by a US Big Four automaker. Softer riding than most competitors in the 1970s, with inferior handling. Spun off a coupé model called the 024 in 1979 (covered separately), which in turn spun off a pick-up truck. Turbo GLH and GLH-S models offered 1984–6. Sold on entry-level price, low equipment level and America model tag (Expo in Canada) from 1987 to 1989. Airbag added in ﬁnal year. Twinned with Plymouth Horizon of these years.

Plymouth Horizon. 1978–90 (prod. unknown). 5-door sedan. F/F, 1594, 1716, 2212 cm³ (4 cyl. OHC). Virtual clone of Dodge Omni, save for trim and badging, and most comments for that model apply here. Similar to Chrysler–Simca Horizon in looks. Coupé model called TC3 (covered separately) rather than 024. Plymouths were aimed less at a sporting audience, so Horizon missed out on GLH and GLH-S variants. Otherwise, Horizon went through the same model cycles, including the 1987–9 America and gained an airbag for 1990.

Talbot–Simca Horizon (C2/L-body). 1979 (prod. 222,296 for all of 1979). 5-door saloon. F/F, 1118, 1294, 1442 cm³ (4 cyl. OHV). With Peugeot taking over Chrysler Europe’s operations, old Chrysler models were renamed Talbot from July 1979. Chrysler–Simca Horizon became Talbot–Simca Horizon till the end of the year on the Continent, with some models even featuring the old Chrysler pentastar badge. Comments for Chrysler model apply; for later models, see Talbot Horizon, which this car became in 1980.

Talbot Horizon (C2/L-body). 1979–87 (prod. 842,078 all types, including Chrysler; 418,634 in UK and France only, 1980–5; 150,000 approx. UK only, 1980–5). 5-door saloon. F/F, 1118, 1294, 1442, 1592 cm³ petrol, 1905 cm³ diesel (4 cyl. OHV). Renamed version of Chrysler–Simca Horizon, known brieﬂy as the Talbot–Simca Horizon from July 1979 to the end of that year on the Continent, and similar in style to Dodge Omni and Plymouth Horizon though sharing few parts. Talbot Horizon in UK from July 1979 changeover, as Simca brand not used there for this model. Fairly good handling and ride for the era, though criticized for steering and weight, and body corrosion common on earlier models. Equipment and quality improved through 1980s. Despite a good run from its European Car of the Year win in 1978, the rot was setting in for the 1980s as better competition emerged. Series II models from 1981. Diesel from 1982. UK and French production ceased 1985, but Finnish production continued to 1987.

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Yves Saint Laurent, fashion legend, dies

nobody@vox.com(Jack Yan) — Mon, 02 Jun 2008 14:16:37 +1200

Yves Saint Laurent, arguably the world’s most famous fashion designer, has died in Paris on Sunday, 11.10 p.m. local time, aged 71, according to the Pierre Bergé-Saint Laurent Foundation. Full obituary detailed today at Lucire.

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‘Old Flame’ (an appropriate title)

nobody@vox.com(Jack Yan) — Mon, 19 May 2008 19:04:38 +1200

Lotto

Here’s an audience favourite from New Zealand, advertising the state-run lottery.

Un pub pour la loterie en Nouvelle-Zélande, avec la chanson plus célèbre d’Edith Piaf (‹La vie en rose›, mais en anglais).

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Idiot’s guide to how the Iraq war started

nobody@vox.com(Jack Yan) — Fri, 09 May 2008 18:07:49 +1200

I say that my work at JY&A Consulting is developing plain-English strategies for our clients. So, I thought I’d give the Iraq war a shot and write my recollections in summary form. The Saddam Hussein voice should be read in a South Park style. Steve Bridges plays George W. Bush, with Rory Bremner as Tony Blair. Special guest appearance by Rupert Murdoch.

Saddam Hussein: I gotta gas those Kurds. Let’s let off some WMDs. Where did I put that invitation to those terrorists?
Saddam’s sons-in-law: Saddam has WMDs. A lot of them.
UN: Under the ceasefire, you can’t have them. We’re sending inspectors in.
Inspectors: We found some but there’s more based on what he had before, and we can’t figure out where they are.
UN: Say, Saddam, you need to tell us where some of this stuff has gone to.
Saddam Hussein: Here’s a big-ass report. Chew on that.
UN: Dude, this isn’t complete. In fact, it looks like you have pulled it out of your ass.

Security Council president: Let’s have a vote on a resolution. Who says that we should punish Saddam Hussein if he doesn’t front up on info about his potential for WMDs, where he’s disposed of some of the ones the inspectors can’t find any more, and sort out the money he owes Kuwait?
Security Council members: Yes, we should!
Security Council president: Cool, 15 to 0. Wow, that’s better than that time Saddam invaded Kuwait.

UN: Well, Saddam, here’s resolution 1441. You’ll be in serious trouble if you don’t comply.
Saddam Hussein: Hey, don’t worry about it.

Iraqi ambassador to UN: Here’s the new report.
UN: This is just as stupid as the earlier stuff you handed in. Didn’t you read the questions?
Iraqi ambassador to UN: Yeah, but what are you going to do? Dumbasses.

USA: Right, that means we have to punish this guy under resolution 1441.
France: You need to get one more resolution for military action before you do that.
USA: And if we do, what will do you?
France: We’d veto it.
USA: Basically you are saying that no matter what resolution the international community has voted on, you don’t think we should enforce it?
France: In a word, no. But it’s because of the UN Charter that we have to all agree on military action before we do anything.
USA: Screw you, peacenik.
France: Screw you, warmonger.

George W. Bush: Tony, the French are being assholes. If we don’t enforce this, we’ll look dumb, the UN will look impotent, and Saddam Hussein could continue building up an arsenal. Whatever the case, we don’t know what that smug sonofabitch is doing.
Tony Blair: I agree, George. We either enforce the law, or we say that laws don’t matter. I couldn’t run a country like that.
Gordon Brown: I don’t know if he can run a country. I would do a better job and I have the same initials as the American guy.
John Howard: Count me in.
Jacques Chirac: I hate Americans. But I did meet that Saddam in 1975. Nice guy. We had dinner together.
Jiang Zemin: I like Americans. When they are at war, their economy will be in trouble and they will have to buy more stuff from us!

George W. Bush: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Congress, we have to go to war to enforce international law. Who’s with me?
Majority of Congress: We are.
Minority of Congress: We like French food.

Saddam Hussein: Looks like I’m f***ed. Get me Muhammed Saeed al-Sahaf, the Information Minister!
France: Told you so, the Americans are warmongers.
Liberal media: Don’t worry, we’ll do what we can with slanted reporting to make the troops feel bad. And we’ll give that Information Minister dude a lot of air time.
Rupert Murdoch: Not on my watch. I can set Bill O’Reilly on you.

Now, I know I have missed out some facts to get it into summary format, and the Commander-in-Chief has been edited for fluency, but consider how long the last post was!

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Tony Blair on the reasons for the Iraq war

nobody@vox.com(Jack Yan) — Fri, 09 May 2008 16:45:34 +1200

Bit of a history lesson here. On March 18, 2003, 12.35 p.m., from Hansard.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Tony Blair): I beg to move,

That this House notes its decisions of 25th November 2002 and 26th February 2003 to endorse UN Security Council Resolution 1441; recognises that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles, and its continuing non-compliance with Security Council Resolutions, pose a threat to international peace and security; notes that in the 130 days since Resolution 1441 was adopted Iraq has not co-operated actively, unconditionally and immediately with the weapons inspectors, and has rejected the final opportunity to comply and is in further material breach of its obligations under successive mandatory UN Security Council Resolutions; regrets that despite sustained diplomatic effort by Her Majesty's Government it has not proved possible to secure a second Resolution in the UN because one Permanent Member of the Security Council made plain in public its intention to use its veto whatever the circumstances; notes the opinion of the Attorney General that, Iraq having failed to comply and Iraq being at the time of Resolution 1441 and continuing to be in material breach, the authority to use force under Resolution 678 has revived and so continues today; believes that the United Kingdom must uphold the authority of the United Nations as set out in Resolution 1441 and many Resolutions preceding it, and therefore supports the decision of Her Majesty's Government that the United Kingdom should use all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; offers wholehearted support to the men and women of Her Majesty's Armed Forces now on duty in the Middle East; in the event of military operations requires that, on an urgent basis, the United Kingdom should seek a new Security Council Resolution that would affirm Iraq's territorial integrity, ensure rapid delivery of humanitarian relief, allow for the earliest possible lifting of UN sanctions, an international reconstruction programme, and the use of all oil revenues for the benefit of the Iraqi people and endorse an appropriate post-conflict administration for Iraq, leading to a representative government which upholds human rights and the rule of law for all Iraqis; and also welcomes the imminent publication of the Quartet's roadmap as a significant step to bringing a just and lasting peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians and for the wider Middle East region, and endorses the role of Her Majesty's Government in actively working for peace between Israel and Palestine.

At the outset, I say that it is right that the House debate this issue and pass judgment. That is the democracy that is our right, but that others struggle for in vain. Again, I say that I do not disrespect the views in opposition to mine. This is a tough choice indeed, but it is also a stark one: to stand British troops down now and turn back, or to hold firm to the course that we have set. I believe passionately that we must hold firm to that course. The question most often posed is not "Why does it matter?" but "Why does it matter so much?" Here we are, the Government, with their most serious test, their majority at risk, the first Cabinet resignation over an issue of policy, the main parties internally divided,

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people who agree on everything else—[Hon. Members: "The main parties?"] Ah, yes, of course. The Liberal Democrats—unified, as ever, in opportunism and error. [Interruption.]
   The country and the Parliament reflect each other. This is a debate that, as time has gone on, has become less bitter but no less grave. So why does it matter so much? Because the outcome of this issue will now determine more than the fate of the Iraqi regime and more than the future of the Iraqi people who have been brutalised by Saddam for so long, important though those issues are. It will determine the way in which Britain and the world confront the central security threat of the 21st century, the development of the United Nations, the relationship between Europe and the United States, the relations within the European Union and the way in which the United States engages with the rest of the world. So it could hardly be more important. It will determine the pattern of international politics for the next generation.
   First, let us recap the history of Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. In April 1991, after the Gulf war, Iraq was given 15 days to provide a full and final declaration of all its weapons of mass destruction. Saddam had used the weapons against Iran and against his own people, causing thousands of deaths. He had had plans to use them against allied forces. It became clear, after the Gulf war, that Iraq's WMD ambitions were far more extensive than had hitherto been thought. So the issue was identified by the United Nations at that time as one for urgent remedy. UNSCOM, the weapons inspection team, was set up. It was expected to complete its task, following the declaration, at the end of April 1991. The declaration, when it came, was false: a blanket denial of the programme, other than in a very tentative form. And so the 12-year game began.
   The inspectors probed. Finally, in March 1992, Iraq admitted that it had previously undeclared weapons of mass destruction, but it said that it had destroyed them. It gave another full and final declaration. Again the inspectors probed. In October 1994, Iraq stopped co-operating with the weapons inspectors altogether. Military action was threatened. Inspections resumed. In March 1996, in an effort to rid Iraq of the inspectors, a further full and final declaration of WMD was made. By July 1996, however, Iraq was forced to admit that declaration, too, was false.
   In August, it provided yet another full and final declaration. Then, a week later, Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, defected to Jordan. He disclosed a far more extensive biological weapons programme and, for the first time, said that Iraq had weaponised the programme—something that Saddam had always strenuously denied. All this had been happening while the inspectors were in Iraq.
   Kamal also revealed Iraq's crash programme to produce a nuclear weapon in the 1990s. Iraq was then forced to release documents that showed just how extensive those programmes were. In November 1996, Jordan intercepted prohibited components for missiles

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that could be used for weapons of mass destruction. Then a further "full and final declaration" was made. That, too, turned out to be false.
   In June 1997, inspectors were barred from specific sites. In September 1997, lo and behold, yet another "full and final declaration" was made—also false. Meanwhile, the inspectors discovered VX nerve agent production equipment, the existence of which had always been denied by the Iraqis.
   In October 1997, the United States and the United Kingdom threatened military action if Iraq refused to comply with the inspectors. Finally, under threat of action in February 1998, Kofi Annan went to Baghdad and negotiated a memorandum with Saddam to allow inspections to continue. They did continue, for a few months. In August, co-operation was suspended.
   In December, the inspectors left. Their final report is a withering indictment of Saddam's lies, deception and obstruction, with large quantities of weapons of mass destruction unaccounted for. Then, in December 1998, the US and the UK undertook Desert Fox, a targeted bombing campaign to degrade as much of the Iraqi WMD facility as we could.
   In 1999, a new inspection team, UNMOVIC, was set up. Saddam refused to allow those inspectors even to enter Iraq. So there they stayed, in limbo, until, after resolution 1441 last November, they were allowed to return.
   That is the history—and what is the claim of Saddam today? Why, exactly the same as before: that he has no weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, we are asked to believe that after seven years of obstruction and non-compliance, finally resulting in the inspectors' leaving in 1998—seven years in which he hid his programme and built it up, even when the inspectors were there in Iraq—when they had left, he voluntarily decided to do what he had consistently refused to do under coercion.
   When the inspectors left in 1998, they left unaccounted for 10,000 litres of anthrax; a far-reaching VX nerve agent programme; up to 6,500 chemical munitions; at least 80 tonnes of mustard gas, and possibly more than 10 times that amount; unquantifiable amounts of sarin, botulinum toxin and a host of other biological poisons; and an entire Scud missile programme. We are asked now seriously to accept that in the last few years—contrary to all history, contrary to all intelligence—Saddam decided unilaterally to destroy those weapons. I say that such a claim is palpably absurd.
   Resolution 1441 is very clear. It lays down a final opportunity for Saddam to disarm. It rehearses the fact that he has for years been in material breach of 17 UN resolutions. It says that this time compliance must be full, unconditional and immediate, the first step being a full and final declaration of all weapons of mass destruction to be given on 8 December last year.
   I will not go through all the events since then, as the House is familiar with them, but this much is accepted by all members of the UN Security Council: the 8 December declaration is false. That in itself, incidentally, is a material breach. Iraq has taken some steps in co-operation, but no one disputes that it is not

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fully co-operating. Iraq continues to deny that it has any weapons of mass destruction, although no serious intelligence service anywhere in the world believes it.
On 7 March, the inspectors published a remarkable document. It is 173 pages long, and details all the unanswered questions about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. It lists 29 different areas in which the inspectors have been unable to obtain information. On VX, for example, it says:

"Documentation available to UNMOVIC suggests that Iraq at least had had far reaching plans to weaponise VX".

On mustard gas, it says:

"Mustard constituted an important part . . . of Iraq's CW arsenal . . . 550 mustard filled shells and up to 450 mustard filled aerial bombs unaccounted for . . . additional uncertainty"

with respect to over 6,500 aerial bombs,

"corresponding to approximately 1,000 tonnes of agent, predominantly mustard."

On biological weapons, the inspectors' report states:

"Based on unaccounted for growth media, Iraq's potential production of anthrax could have been in the range of about 15,000 to 25,000 litres . . . Based on all the available evidence, the strong presumption is that about 10,000 litres of anthrax was not destroyed and may still exist."

On that basis, I simply say to the House that, had we meant what we said in resolution 1441, the Security Council should have convened and condemned Iraq as in material breach. What is perfectly clear is that Saddam is playing the same old games in the same old way. Yes, there are minor concessions, but there has been no fundamental change of heart or mind.
   However, after 7 March, the inspectors said that there was at least some co-operation, and the world rightly hesitated over war. Let me now describe to the House what then took place.
   We therefore approached a second resolution in this way. As I said, we could have asked for the second resolution then and there, because it was justified. Instead, we laid down an ultimatum calling upon Saddam to come into line with resolution 1441, or be in material breach. That is not an unreasonable proposition, given the history, but still countries hesitated. They asked, "How do we judge what is full co-operation?"
   So we then worked on a further compromise. We consulted the inspectors and drew up five tests, based on the document that they published on 7 March. Those tests included allowing interviews with 30 scientists to be held outside Iraq, and releasing details of the production of the anthrax, or at least of the documentation showing what had happened to it. The inspectors added another test: that Saddam should publicly call on Iraqis to co-operate with them.
   So we constructed this framework: that Saddam should be given a specified time to fulfil all six tests to show full co-operation; and that, if he did so, the inspectors could then set out a forward work programme that would extend over a period of time to make sure that disarmament happened. However, if Saddam failed to meet those tests to judge compliance, action would follow.
   So there were clear benchmarks, plus a clear ultimatum. Again, I defy anyone to describe that as an unreasonable proposition.

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   Last Monday, we were getting very close with it. We very nearly had the majority agreement. If I might, I should particularly like to thank the President of Chile for the constructive way in which he approached this issue.
   Yes, there were debates about the length of the ultimatum, but the basic construct was gathering support. Then, on Monday night, France said that it would veto a second resolution, whatever the circumstances. Then France denounced the six tests. Later that day, Iraq rejected them. Still, we continued to negotiate, even at that point.
   Last Friday, France said that it could not accept any resolution with an ultimatum in it. On Monday, we made final efforts to secure agreement. However, the fact is that France remains utterly opposed to anything that lays down an ultimatum authorising action in the event of non-compliance by Saddam.

I realize not everyone likes to read Hansard, and I certainly didn’t when I was at law school. Perhaps this excerpt from later on might be more useful and it is the crux of the international disagreement. The Prime Minister outlined his position on resolution 1441:

It is correct that resolution 1441 did not say that there would be another resolution authorising the use of force, but the implication of resolution 1441—it was stated in terms—was that if Iraq continued in material breach, defined as not co-operating fully, immediately and unconditionally, serious consequences should follow. All we are asking for in the second resolution is the clear ultimatum that if Saddam continues to fail to co-operate, force should be used. The French position is that France will vote no, whatever the circumstances. Those are not my words, but those of the French President. I find it sad that at this point in time he cannot support us in the position we have set out, which is the only sure way to disarm Saddam. And what, indeed, would any tyrannical regime possessing weapons of mass destruction think when viewing the history of the world's diplomatic dance with Saddam over these 12 years? That our capacity to pass firm resolutions has only been matched by our feebleness in implementing them. That is why this indulgence has to stop—because it is dangerous: dangerous if such regimes disbelieve us; dangerous if they think they can use our weakness, our hesitation, and even the natural urges of our democracy towards peace against us; and dangerous because one day they will mistake our innate revulsion against war for permanent incapacity, when, in fact, if pushed to the limit, we will act. But when we act, after years of pretence, the action will have to be harder, bigger, more total in its impact. It is true that Iraq is not the only country with weapons of mass destruction, but I say this to the House: back away from this confrontation now, and future conflicts will be infinitely worse and more devastating in their effects.

   I do believe Mr Blair was right in his last sentence, because Saddam Hussein would have armed Iraq more and more.
   We know history has shown us that there gaffes along the way with a loss of many lives, Coalition and Iraqi, but from the point of view of international law, the above outlines pretty well why the war began: a breach of resolution 1441. This was also why Congress voted yes to attacking Iraq, not the reasons now given by certain politicians.
   As I wrote in an earlier post on the subject, countries have taken two positions on the resolution: the US–UK one, which says 1441 must be enforced if the UN Security Council is to save any face; and the French one, which required a second resolution authorizing force (but which it said it would veto). Countries like New Zealand took the latter position.
   I make no judgement on which is right and which is wrong here.
   Certain American presidential candidates need to level with the American people on why they are changing their minds about the Iraq war. The reasons I have heard from the likes of Sen. Clinton are so far fabrications at worst, and the result of a poor memory at best.
   Sen. Clinton voted to enforce a UN Security Council resolution, just as her husband did in Kosovo, without a second resolution.
   She needs to tell the American people why her position on enforcing international law has now changed and I see nothing wrong if she merely fronted up with her rationale.
   As I said in the comments to that earlier post, I do not mind the anti-war brigade or the anti-war rhetoric of the US Democratic Party as long as their arguments are founded in truth. There are strong arguments against going into Iraq backed by many nations, but it is very odd that they are not used; instead, Bush- and troop-bashing seem to be the norm. That makes me question their motives and it makes me rather sad for those who believe their arguments: what they do is divide a country and hurt us all.

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David Horowitz on the reasons for the Iraq War

nobody@vox.com(Jack Yan) — Thu, 08 May 2008 18:38:19 +1200

Whether you support the war in Iraq or you don’t—and here in New Zealand we have the luxury to criticize the United States—David Horowitz’s recollection (video found originally on Humbled Infidel’s blog) of why the US went in certainly correlates with my own. It’s why I have always held back attacking President George W. Bush, because faced with what he had in front of him, I cannot honestly say I would not have done the same thing. As Horowitz reveals, neither would Al Gore, who supported Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech in 2002.
   The end of this video (cut short) goes into the rationale for war surrounding UN Security Council resolution 1441, which PM Tony Blair managed to sell to Parliament—but which, I always felt, the US was less successful at doing. There are legal arguments there based on the UN Charter but it was always about 1441.
   This is one of the problems I tend to have with the US Democratic Party, for all my own left-leaning tendencies. Right now, for example, constituents are begging the super-delegates that they should not select who will best beat Sen. John McCain and the Republicans, but who represents their position. The fact this question has even arisen is disturbing: as representatives of the people of course one should represent the citizens. The minute you do not, you do not have a democracy: it is a quest for power among élites ignoring the citizenry, the sort of thing people were getting away from when the US was founded.
   I am not saying that the GOP wouldn’t look after its own, but given that they have fielded men like Sen. Bob Dole—who from a marketing perspective was a tough sell against President Clinton—it seems that it might be more willing to represent its base than look at seizing power. The 42nd president gifted them the Monica Lewinsky situation, which hurt the Democrats. I would say that they never forgave the GOP or Kenneth Starr who were steadfast in their condemnation and investigation. That power-hungriness from the Democrats is very apparent in the way the Bush administration has been undermined in the last eight years.

David Horowitz - Party of Defeat

   I say if one opposes the war, then there are ways to do it without resorting to revisionism. I might not agree with our PM, Helen Clark, on her courses of action, but at least she took a position based on the facts before her and said ‘No’ to going in to Iraq. She has never gone and revised history, and simply held firm on her principles. She has good support for it because most New Zealanders opposed the war and carried out her job (on that occasion) as a servant and representative of the people.
   The consequences of Resolution 1441 were always clear but the means of acting upon them were less so because of the way the UN Charter is written, and that ambiguity effectively gave some countries a chance of opting out. Our PM took it, as did the leaders of many other nations. It is respectful, even if she later made a gaffe about how she did not think a Gore presidency would have gone to war. (As Horowitz reminds us, that is probably an incorrect position.) They believed that an extra resolution was needed before war; the US, UK, Australia and others did not.
   The Democratic Party and the anti-war movement probably think that this is all too tough to sell to the public, so they engage in other tactics, shaming US troops or the administration and pressuring those who have short memories to join their cause. I am not saying that what they have uncovered is all untrue—of course I accept there are dodgy dealings surrounding the war and I even accept some misconduct—but they’d earn my respect if they didn’t flip-flop or cover up the truth. Sen. Clinton, who voted for the war, who voted for the increase in expenditure alongside Sen. John Kerry, is one of those very high-profile politicians who has changed depending on the trade winds of public opinion.
   Of course a senator or a future president must be representative but she must also stand on truth. ‘I was wrong to have supported the war because …’ would have been a good start. ‘Now the American people are telling me that it is time to withdraw our troops.
   ‘My support was founded on the belief that resolution 1441 was inviolable. It was not, and we have carried out the due punishment needed on Saddam Hussein’s régime.’
   There are millions of ways to spin it, especially ways to do it without demoralizing the young men and women serving in Iraq—and I am not even a politician.
   This would also mean she’d have to go against her husband’s attacks on Kosovo, which also did not have that additional Security Council resolution but was a preemptive strike by the US. George W. Bush is not alone, just that the media give him more grief over it.
   But a mea culpa is not flip-flopping and it is not pandering. It is being honest, something the Beltway sees very rarely.
   What concerns me, however, is that the road to war is a serious matter. It should not be so easily bent because the decision should be founded on principle—and if those principles existed after resolution 1441 was broken then they exist today. Congress voted for the war, with bipartisan support. There needs to be a far bigger shift for any US representative to say no to the war now—so what is it?
   A poor entry strategy, a poor exit strategy, the belief that the US’s only task was to oust Saddam Hussein, the belief that the parameters of the original declaration of war have been fulfilled—what? Certainly Sen. Clinton needs to tell us.
   She has said that she would not have voted for the war if she knew there were no WMDs. But as Horowitz points out, the existence of WMDs was not the basis for war. Did Sen. Clinton “misspeak” again?
   There is a popular notion that that was what resolution 1441 was all about and we all remember Sec. Powell’s Powerpoint presentations to the UN.
   But unless Sen. Clinton has misremembered this incident as well, resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002 was about Iraq’s non-compliance with conditions laid down by the international community over disarmament, which included WMDs, but they were not the core issue.
   When Iraq lied about what it did with its WMDs, which the international community confirmed it had as late as 1998, the US took a hard line.
   Iraq itself never offered an explanation on the discrepancy between its claims and tests by the inspectors.
   That was one legal justification for the US and the UK, and, skipping over a few issues, the war began.
   I sure wish the US politicians would just tell the truth about the vote at that time because they should have a better understanding of it, having been there—rather than let people like me catch them out.
   This is another reason to not dislike Bush: he said he would stay the course, so he did. The majority of Americans voted for him in 2004 (regardless of whether one is counting the electoral college or the popular vote) and knew this full well. And while I think some of his spending has sent that US deficit soaring, he has stayed firm on his belief in his tax cuts. He seems content because he thinks he is protecting the Constitution and that he needs to continue his strategy. Maybe that is the Bush world-view. (He saw how his Dad got burned on the ‘No new taxes’ and learned from it. He saw how his Dad lost the support of the right wing of the GOP and learned from it. And he saw how he was criticized for being too smart when he ran for Congress—which is where the folksy public image comes from. Welcome to Bushland.)
   Had the war successfully concluded people would praise him on his steadfastness.
   For if a leader bends based on the trade winds, then will she bend based on pressure from other sovereign nations? If Saudi Arabia put pressure to bear on the US, would Sen. Clinton cave in? If a communist nation put pressure on Sen. Obama, would he? Or, for that matter, how far will Sen. McCain bend to foreign pressure?
   We cannot turn back the clock now and see how the message could have been better communicated to the US. We should know, from the Horowitz video, why the US went in and understand who is now lying to the American public: that is important. For all his failings in everything from the Patriot Act (which I am no fan of, and it has restricted the movement of people who could benefit the US) to the Alberto González judicial appointments, I do not think it was President Bush. I have never called him a bare-faced liar.
   The next presidential election is a chance to address those failings. The economy can be fixed but what is in dire need of repair are the values to which not only Americans want moral leadership, but most of us in the western world. Get the values right, get the truth right, and the rest will follow.
   At the end of the day I care not if the president is a Democrat or a Republican, and I have no say in it anyway, as long as our common values are restored and preserved, and the leader is truthful. And that the decision for staying the course or withdrawing is also founded on truth.

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The Brits are in love with Carla Bruni-Sarkozy

nobody@vox.com(Jack Yan) — Fri, 28 Mar 2008 11:09:18 +1200

Les Anglais amoureux de CARLA BRUNI SARKOZY

From France 2, Carla Bruni-Sarkozy got a much better reception in the UK than in France. A nice summary of the very packed two days for the Sarkozys, with an emphasis on the First Lady. The kiss in the segment is a nice, romantic finalé to the piece.

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The cameras are on Carla: video from the French state visit

nobody@vox.com(Jack Yan) — Fri, 28 Mar 2008 10:01:03 +1200

08-03-26-LONDRES-Arrivee-WINDSOR[1]

This video, from the Élysée, was taken yesterday when the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, and the First Lady arrived in London to meet HM Queen Elizabeth II and HH the Duke of Edinburgh. I wrote in a comment on Timothy’s Vox blog, after reading an article about it, that Mme Sarkozy did not know where to stand and tried to follow her husband and the Queen on the inspection. I was wrong: looking at this video, the First Lady knew exactly where to go and accompanied Prince Philip in her meet-and-greet. The Jacqueline Kennedy comparisons aren’t invalid.
And it seems the newly hyphenated Carla Bruni-Sarkozy is on her way to being the most photographed woman of 2008: her image sells political, fashion (she’s wearing Dior by John Galliano) and gossip media.

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Sarkozy trades insults as the Ordinary Bloke

nobody@vox.com(Jack Yan) — Mon, 25 Feb 2008 22:57:22 +1300

Sarkozy insulte un visiteur/Sarkozy insults a visitor

This video is doing the rounds in France and is the number-one result for searches on Dailymotion for Sarkozy. The story: it’s an agricultural show and President Nicolas Sarkozy turns up. There’s a bloke in the audience who won’t shake the President’s hand, because he says he could get himself dirtied up. The President tells him to ‘Bugger off, you dumb bastard,’ which is about as accurate as I dare make the translation. (Various translations on the ’net differ, especially around the words pauvre con that M. Sarkozy actually utters—it can be as harsh as ‘dumb c***’.)
   I know, his opponents are saying this is not very presidential, and some are crying out that they do not like how President Sarkozy is so “hands-on”. It’s odd: I’d rather my head of state be hands-on, meeting the people, being the Ordinary Bloke.
   I will say that M. Sarkozy’s language could have been a lot better though, but I am willing to bet we antipodeans have a greater stomach for our PMs getting colourful.
   However, our head of state is technically HM Queen Elizabeth II. We may wish for her to be more hands-on, but we only expect that language from her husband.

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Newspaper exaggerates Sarkozy’s spending, minimizes Ségo’s

nobody@vox.com(Jack Yan) — Sat, 19 Jan 2008 15:51:43 +1300

This was interesting today. The Daily Telegraph reported on the campaign spending (specifically on make-up and grooming) by Nicolas Sarkozy and his rival Ségolène Royal during the French presidential election. Despite being thought of as a conservative newspaper, it painted a rosier picture of Mlle Royal than M. Sarkozy.
First up, Sarkozy’s (over-)spending was the lead-in to the story, even though Royal’s was much higher. Mlle Royal’s spending was left to the third paragraph.
Secondly, the standards used to round off are biased in favour of Ségolène Royal. Here are the figures I uncovered, compared with the rounding that the Telegraph did.

Nicolas Sarkozy, spent €34,445—rounded in The Daily Telegraph as €35,000 (I would have rounded it to €34,000 or said ‘around €34,500’)
Ségolène Royal, spent €53,581—rounded in The Daily Telegraph as €52,000 (I would have rounded it to €54,000—correspondent Henry Samuel shaves off a hefty €1,581 for the socialist leader)

Reimbursements:

Nicolas Sarkozy was reimbursed €11,482—The Daily Telegraph reported €12,000 (I would have rounded it to €11,000 or said ‘around €11,500’)
Ségolène Royal was reimbursed €17,220—The Daily Telegraph reported €17,000 (I would have used the same figure)

In every case, it might have been easier just to report the actual figures.
The message, unless the figures I got from the French media are wrong: overestimate the spending by the right and make it look like the President is getting more state funds; underestimate the spending by the left and understate its burden on the state.
The Telegraph might need to re-examine its mathematics.

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